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INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION,
TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS AND BANK
SECRECY: BRAZILIAN DIFFICULTIES TO
FIT GLOBAL STANDARDS
Carlos Otdvio Ferreira de Almeida*
I. INTRODUCTION
ECENT developments in international tax cooperation reveal it
to be one of the most crucial topics at the beginning of this cen-
tury.1 Not only international organizations, but also individual
countries have constantly been discussing this theme to tackle harmful
tax competition effectively.2 As a result, transparency and the exchange
of tax information have been valued too highly as relevant issues in the
cooperative approach.
Nevertheless, obtaining cross-border information might not be an easy
task. Barriers like domestic laws, uncertainty over administrative proce-
dures, and a cultural tendency towards secrecy in some societies could
threaten the flow of information. 3
In this sense, bank secrecy becomes a major obstacle for tax authori-
ties. The way in which some countries tend towards a broader openness
whilst others stringently protect bank secrecy is intriguing. As a result of
this situation, there is some uncertainty about how efficiently a state
could comply with an exchange of information request.4
Until recently, the internationally agreed upon standard for trans-
parency was the exchange of tax information upon request.5 But mem-
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1. See, e.g., International Tax Cooperation: OECD Standard for Automatic Exchange
of Financial Account Information, SULIVAN & CROMWELL 12-13 (Feb. 27, 2014),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SCPublicationInternational_
TaxCooperation 02_27_2014.pdf.
2. Id. at 5-13.
3. Id. at 12-13.
4. Tony Anamourlis & Les Nethercott, An Overview of Tax Information Exchange
Agreements and Bank Secrecy, 63 BULL. FOR INT'L TAX'N 616 (2009).
5. International Tax Cooperation: OECD Standard for Automatic Exchange of Finan-
cial Account Information, supra note 1, at 2; see also Org. for Econ. Cooperation &
Dev. [OECD], Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters art.
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bers of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) have been encouraging a movement to change that standard to
one of automatic information exchange independent of recurrent tax
avoidance, evasion or fraud cases, and this could clash with taxpayers'
fundamental rights.6
Since 1998, tax cooperation has definitely been included on the OECD
agenda.7 At that time-and on the basis that globalization prevents
countries from individually controlling the tax effects of cross-border
transactions-the OECD released both a Report on Harmful Tax Prac-
tices, urging members and non-members to intensify their cooperation,
through recommendations on domestic legislation, tax treaties and coor-
dinated programs of tax cooperation; and a Multilateral Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, as an effective means
to combat tax fraud. 8
But the OECD is not alone in these efforts. The European Union
(EU) has also enacted rules against privacy both inside its frontiers and in
the relations of its member states with third-party countries.9 On this
track, intensive debates led the EU Commission to issue an Action Plan
in December 2012 aiming to more effectively combat tax evasion and
avoidance. 10 From now on, a new global standard for transparency is be-
ing set, one that is capable of providing rapid answers to tax authorities.
Accordingly, the current standard based on information exchange upon
request is being replaced by the automatic model.
5 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/
2082215.pdf.
6. Pasquale Pistone, Exchange of Information and Rubik Agreements: the Perspective
of an EU Academic, 67 Bui-L. FOR INT'L TAX'N 216 (2013).
7. See Emily Wang, Note, The Opaque Future of Tax Information Sharing Between
the United States and China: An Analysis of Bank Secrecy Laws and the Likelihood
of Entrance into a Tax Information Exchange Agreement, 35 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 411, 418-19 (2012).
8. Id. A summary of the post-2000 OECD works to promote tax cooperation could
be listed as follows: Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes Re-
port (2000); Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
Purposes (2000); Tax Information Exchange Agreement Model (TIEA) (2002);
Update to Article 26 of the Model Convention (2005); Tax Co-operation: Towards
a Level Playing Field (2006); Manual on Exchange of Information (2006); Peer
Review Process by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Informa-
tion for Tax Purposes (2010); Amendment to the Multilateral Convention on Mu-
tual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (2010); Keeping It Safe: The OECD
Guide on the Protection of Confidentiality of Information Exchanged for Tax Pur-
poses (2012); Update to Article 26 of the Model Convention (2012); A Step
Change in Tax Transparency: Report for the June G8 Lough Erne Summit (2013);
OECD Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters (2014);
Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information in Tax Mat-
ters (2014); and Tax Transparency: Report on Progress (2014).
9. See, e.g., Council Directive 2014/48, 2014 O.J. (L 111) 50; Council Directive 2011/
16, 2011 O.J. (L 64) 1.
10. Press Release, European Commission, Clamping Down on Tax Evasion and
Avoidance: Commission Presents the Way Forward (Dec. 6, 2012), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-12-1325_en.htm.
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The United States is similarly committed to transparency, and has en-
acted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), a rule amend-
ing sections 1471 to 1474 of the Internal Revenue Code and under which
foreign financial institutions are required "to report information on finan-
cial accounts of U.S. persons and foreign entities with significant U.S.
ownership (U.S. accounts) directly to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
beginning in 2015."l1 Those foreign financial institutions that do not re-
port due information will be subject to essentially a thirty percent with-
holding tax-a true penalty to encourage them to disclose data from US
accountholders. 12
Working closely with the OECD to expand tax cooperation, the G2013
also endorsed the automatic exchange of information for tax matters as
the new global standard during the annual meeting of the Global Forum
on Transparency in Berlin on October 29, 2014.14 This is definitely a
large step towards transparency because fifty-one jurisdictions should ef-
fectively put into practice the automatic exchange of information on the
basis of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assis-
tance in Tax Matters as of September 2017.15
Rather than simply replacing the standard for exchanging tax informa-
tion, international taxation could be moving into a new phase. The sys-
tem's core, previously based on bilateral tax treaties, is now being
reshaped into a "globally coordinated complex legal system" whose main
characteristic is multilateralism. 16 For that reason, it is a real possibility
11. Itai Grinberg, Taxing Capital Income in Emerging Countries: Will FATCA Open
the Door?, GEORGETOWN PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER No. 13-031, 7 (2013),
http:lssrn.com/abstract=2256587 (last visited July 13, 2015) (internal punctuation
marks omitted); see also 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471-74 (2010).
12. Grinberg, supra note 11, at 31. The thirty percent withholding tax applies to: (1)"
any payment of interest (including any original issue discount), dividends, rents,
salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments,
and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, if
such payment is from sources within the United States"; and (2) "any gross pro-
ceeds from the sale or other disposition of any property of a type which can pro-
duce interest or dividends from sources within the United States." 26 U.S.C.
§ 1473.
13. The world's twenty largest economies, the G20 represents around eighty-five per-
cent of global gross domestic product, over seventy-five percent of global trade,
and two thirds of the world's population. G20 countries account for 85% of global
GDP, 75% of world trade, TIMES OF INDIA (June 15, 2015, 6:05 AM), http://times
ofindia.indiatimes.comlbusiness/international-business/G20-countries-account-for-
85-of-global-GDP-75-of-world-trade/articleshow/47670497.cms.
14. Major new steps to boost international cooperation against tax evasion: Govern-
ments commit to implement automatic exchange of information beginning 2017,
OECD (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.oecd.orglnewsroom/major-new-steps-to-boost-
international-cooperation-against-tax-evasion-governments-commit-to-implement-
automatic-exchange-of-information-beginning-2017.htm.
15. Id. Other OECD and G20 members are expected to run the automatic standard in
September 2018. Id. Brazil is in this group since the Multilateral Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters is pending congressional ap-
proval and not yet in force.
16. Pasquale Pistone, Coordinating the Action of Regional and Global Players during
the Shift from Bilateralism to Multilateralism in International Tax Law, 6 WORLD
TAX J. 1, 3-9 (2014).
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that countries will remain committed to expanding tax cooperation with
developing countries, which have often been used as part of multination-
als' tax planning for avoiding or evading taxes.
Since the 2008 crisis, cross-border tax planning that diverts profits to
low- or no-tax jurisdictions has been recognized as a global problem that
requires a global solution.17 To that end, the OECD and the G20
launched the Action Plan against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS), which mobilized a number of developing countries to ensure
that profits are taxed in the jurisdiction in which the economic activities
producing those profits are performed and value is created. 18
That tendency in international taxation, which is led by the OECD but
also supported by other players such as the EU and the G20, has affected
states' sovereignty and even suggests that regionalism should yield to
multilateralism. This paper intends to analyze, from a Brazilian perspec-
tive, the rapid expansion in international tax cooperation without neglect-
ing the study of taxpayers' safeguards, particularly bank secrecy, which
has not yet been developed in the same way.
In fact, the new international tax scenario expands the investigative
powers of tax authorities without a clear corresponding consideration of
the basic rights of taxpayers. Brazil has followed the OECD's general
directions by, for instance, signing Tax Information Exchange Agree-
ments (TIEAs), expanding the scope of Article 26 of double tax treaties,
and signing the OECD Multilateral Convention. Moreover, Brazil is a
G20 member and part of the OECD's enhanced engagement program,
through which the OECD forges closer relationships with the BRICS19
countries (except Russia) with a view towards eventual membership. 20
As to the Global Transparency Forum, Brazil performs a relevant role in
both the Steering Group and the Peer Review Group, which are in charge
of accelerating the implementation of standards for the exchange of tax
information. 21 That said, it is unclear how and to what extent taxpayers'
safeguards-especially bank secrecy-will be respected in this expanded
transparency landscape.
17. See, e.g., Press Release, European Commission, Taxation of Savings: The Euro-
pean Commission Proposes Changes to Eliminate Tax Evasion (Nov. 13, 2008),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-08-1697_en.htm?locale=en.
18. For more details on BEPS, visit: http://www.oecd.org/tax/strategy-deepening-de
veloping-country-engagement.pdf.
19. An acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
20. International Tax Cooperation: OECD Standard for Automatic Exchange of Finan-
cial Account Information, supra note 1, at 7; STAN Bilateral Trade Database: Doc-
umentation, OECD 1 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/44624896.pdf.
21. Steering Group, OECD, http://www.oecd.orgltax/transparency/steeringgroup.htm
(last visited July 20, 2015); Peer Review Group, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/
transparency/peerreviewgroup.htm (last visited July 20, 2015).
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II. INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION: MOVING FROM A
BILATERAL TO A MULTILATERAL APPROACH
To encourage cooperation, the OECD suggested the creation of the
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax
Purposes.22 The Forum started its work in 2000 by releasing its first list of
thirty-five jurisdictions that it threatened to define as non-cooperative tax
havens if they did not give commitments about the exchange of informa-
tion in tax matters.23 The creation of a new international standard for
transparency and exchange of information for tax, however, did not come
about until 2002, when the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs initiated a
comprehensive review of Article 26 of the Model Convention, which gov-
erns the exchange of information, to consider the then recent develop-
ments emerging from the Report on Improving Access to Bank
Information for Tax Purposes (2000) and the Model Agreement on Ex-
change of Information on Tax Matters (2002).24 At that time, a new
phase in tackling tax evasion had just begun due to concerns about en-
larging the scope of Article 26 and its Commentaries with a view towards
exchanging tax information and accessing bank data effectively. 25 An-
other update that was adopted by the United Nations (UN) Model Tax
Convention took place in 2005 .26
With the establishment of internationally accepted standards on tax
matters, the OECD divided jurisdictions into three groups: (1) those that
have not given a commitment to implement the internationally agreed tax
standards (blacklist); (2) those that have given a commitment to imple-
ment the standards, but have not yet substantially done so (gray list); and
(3) those that have substantially implemented the standards (white list).27
The Global Forum currently has more than 120 members who are work-
ing towards the effective implementation of the international standards
for transparency and the exchange of information for tax purposes.28 All
members are monitored and reviewed in a two-step approach: "phase 1"
is dedicated to assessing the quality of a country's legal and regulatory
22. See Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Pur-
poses, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-global-forum/ (last
visited August 21, 2015).
23. Jeffrey Owens, Towards World Tax Cooperation: Is the OECD Against Tax Com-
petition?, OECD OBSERVE-R, http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/
aid/271frowardsworld-tax co-operation.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
24. Update to Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and Its Commentary,
OECD 1 (July 17, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/
120718_Article%2026-ENG no%20cover%20(2).pdf.
25. See id. at 2-4.
26. OECD publishes a new, updated version of its Model Tax Convention, OECD (July
9, 2005), http://www.oecd.org/general/oecdpublishesanewupdatedversionofits
modeltaxconvention.htm.
27. See A Progress Report on the Jurisdictions Surveyed by the OECD Global Forum
in Implementing the Internationally Agreed Tax Standard, OECD (Apr. 2, 2009),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/42497950.pdf.
28. Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/ (last visited July 13, 2015).
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framework for the exchange of information; and "phase 2" looks at the
practical implementation of that framework. 29 In addition, non-member
jurisdictions may be reviewed if considered relevant for the work of the
Global Forum.30
The Global Forum therefore performs peer reviews that analyze cer-
tain characteristics in accordance with international tax standards. Those
standards could be detailed as follows: (1) availability of relevant infor-
mation, e.g., ownership and identity information, accounting records, and
banking information; (2) access to information, i.e., competent authori-
ties' ability to obtain and provide information in a timely fashion, notifi-
cation requirements, and rights and safeguards; and (3) effective
exchange of information, i.e., mechanisms for exchange of information
with all relevant partners, confidentiality, rights and safeguards of taxpay-
ers and third parties, and timeliness of responses to requests for
information.
The Global Forum works dynamically to addresses recent develop-
ments on the international tax scene. For that reason, standards for trans-
parency and exchange of information will need to be updated in step with
progress on the fight against harmful tax competition. To illustrate, the
recently launched OECD Action Plan against BEPS aligns with a new
trend in international taxation, previously indicated by the Multilateral
Convention on Mutual Assistance, which moves from bilateralism to mul-
tilateralism. 31 A collection of many bilateral arrangements for the auto-
matic exchange of tax information is arguably less effective than a
multilateral framework for the same goal because the multilateral frame-
work allows countries to effectively engage in wider international mutual
assistance.
A. ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH
BILATERAL TAX TREATIES
Annet Wanyana Oguttu argues that countries are not commonly enti-
tled to free exchange of tax information because they need a legal instru-
ment or mechanism to do so. 32 Consider, for instance, the following
examples of tax information exchange, each of which contains a legal
component: bilateral exchange through bilateral tax treaties or TIEAs,
multilateral exchange through multilateral agreements, regional exchange
through regional instruments that permit information exchange, and uni-
lateral exchange through domestic legislation that allows such




31. About BEPS, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/taxlbeps-about.htm (last visited July 20,
2015).
32. Annet Wanyana Oguttu, A Critique on the Effectiveness of 'Exchange of Informa-
tion on Tax Matters' in Preventing Tax Avoidance and Evasion: A South African
Perspective, 68 BULl,. FOR INT'L TAX'N. 2, 2-19 (2014).
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disclosure. 33
Global economic considerations in particular increase signatory states'
interest in the reciprocal supply of information. As a result, Article 26 of
the OECD Model Tax Convention and its Commentaries have been up-
dated since 2002 to reflect modern international tax standards, including
exchange of tax information to the widest possible extent. In line with
that policy, 2005 update amended Paragraphs One and Two, and added
Paragraphs Four and Five. The last update, on July 17, 2012, again
amended Paragraph Two and further developed the interpretation of the
Convention. After updates, the final text reads as follows:
Article 26-EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall ex-
change such information as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out
the provisions of this Convention or to the administration or en-
forcement of the domestic laws concerning taxes of every kind and
description imposed on behalf of the Contracting States, or of
their political subdivisions or local authorities, insofar as the taxa-
tion thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. The exchange
of information is not restricted by Articles 1 and 2.34
The OECD Model Article 1 deals with residence, while Article 2 ad-
dresses taxes covered by the Convention. Thus, neither residence status
nor taxes on income or capital should restrict the exchange of informa-
tion. The phrase "foreseeably relevant"-inserted as a replacement for
"necessary"-was included to clarify that Contracting States are not
obliged to provide information for fishing expeditions or "speculative re-
quests that have no apparent nexus to an open inquiry or investigation. '35
2. Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting
State shall be treated as secret in the same manner as information ob-
tained under the domestic laws of that State and shall be disclosed
only to persons or authorities (including courts and administrative
bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforce-
ment or prosecution in respect of, the determination of appeals in
relation to the taxes referred to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of
the above. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only
for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court
proceedings or in judicial decisions. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
information received by a Contracting State may be used for other
purposes when such information may be used for such other purposes
under the laws of both States and the competent authority of the sup-
plying State authorizes such use.3 6
It is worth noting that the use of tax information is restricted by the
requesting state's own domestic rules regarding secrecy. Although Brazil
33. Id.
34. Update to Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and Its Commentary,
supra note 24, at 1 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
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is not an OECD member, it follows the OECD Model Convention when
signing double tax treaties. To that end, Article 198 of the Brazilian Tax
Code forbids the Treasury and its agents from disclosing information ob-
tained by virtue of their knowledge of a taxpayer or third party's financial
condition or the nature and state of its business or activity, without
prejudice to criminal law provisions.37
The last part of this paragraph ("Notwithstanding the foregoing, infor-
mation.., such use"), added by 2012 update, gives rise to a controversial
issue: the use of tax information for purposes not related to taxation.
With that in mind, Paragraph Two expressly mentions "under the laws of
both States."
3. If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance
with this Article, the other Contracting State shall use its information
gathering measures to obtain the requested information, even
though that other State may not need such information for its own
tax purposes. The obligation contained in the preceding sentence is
subject to the limitations of paragraph 3 but in no case shall such
limitations be construed to permit a Contracting State to decline to
supply information solely because it has no domestic interest in such
information .38
Irrespective of whether it has an interest in the requested information,
the requested State is bound to apply its information gathering measures
to obtain the information asked for by the other signatory State. This
provision resulted from the 2005 update to the Model.
4. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 3 be construed to
permit a Contracting State to decline to supply information solely be-
cause the information is held by a bank, other financial institution,
nominee or person acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity or be-
cause it relates to ownership interests in a person. 39
But the 2005 update's impact did not end there. Another provision
means that bank secrecy should not be a barrier to transparency and the
exchange of tax information. Bank secrecy, one of the many different
aspects of privacy, might arguably be treated as a fundamental right pro-
tected by the constitution, depending on the domestic law of the relevant
country. As discussed below in Section IV, this is the case in Brazil,
where bank secrecy is a key issue in the conflict between privacy and
transparency as to tax matters.
OECD Commentary 9 to Model Article 26 provides three avenues for
information exchange: (1) "on request, with a special case in mind, it be-
ing understood that the regular sources of information available under
the internal taxation procedure should be relied upon in the first place
37. Lei No. 5172, de 27 de Outubre de 1966, CODIGO TRI3uTARIo NACIONAL [C.T.N.]
de 25.210.1966 (Braz.).
38. Update to Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and Its Commentary,
supra note 24, at 1 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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before a request for information is made to the other State;" (2) "auto-
matically, for example when information about one or various categories
of income having their source in one Contracting State and received in
the other Contracting State is transmitted systematically to the other
State;" and (3) "spontaneously, for example in the case of a State having
acquired through certain investigations, information which it supposes to
be of interest to the other State."40
B. A MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO TAX COOPERATION
As a result of integrated action taken by the OECD, accompanied by
the G841 and the G20, the automatic exchange of information has become
the international standard in place of the previous "upon request" sys-
tem. In fact, a Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement signed by
fifty-one states on October 29, 2014, covers the automatic exchange of
information based on Article 6 of the Multilateral Convention.42 From
now on, source countries should periodically send taxpayer information
to residence countries concerning different categories of income, includ-
ing, inter alia, dividends, interests, royalties and salaries.
The United States has also brought in innovations for tackling tax eva-
sion and enhancing transparency. To access U.S. taxpayers' data abroad,
the United States has launched FATCA, which has a wider automatic
scope than the rules in force for some income categories under the EU's
jurisdiction, where the "upon request" rule still applies. Reflecting an
intense discussion between European authorities, on June 12, 2013, the
EU Commission issued a Proposal for amending Directive 2011/16/EU to
make mandatory the automatic exchange of information for combatting
tax fraud and tax evasion.43
From the EU standpoint, adopting automatic exchange of information
would avoid possible discrepancies in effectiveness caused by different
situations in the twenty-seven Member States. In fact, the most favored
nation (MFN) clause was a prime reason for the EU proposal in favor of
automatic information exchange insofar as various EU Member States
had been directly negotiating a Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA) with the United States.44 Without this proposal, the FATCA
40. Id. at 7.
41. The world's eight most industrialized economies. Russia, however, was asked to
leave the group in March 2014 because of the crisis in the Ukraine. So it might
now be more correct to refer to the G7.
42. Automatic Exchange of Information, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-
tax-information/automaticexchange.htm (last visited July 20, 2015).
43. Proposal for a Council Directive 2013/0188, amending Directive 2011/16/EU as
Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange of Information in the Field of Taxation,
1 (Dec. 6, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/resources/docu
ments/taxation/taxcooperation/mutual assistance/direct tax-directive/corn_2013_
348_- en.pdf.
44. There have already been two EU provisions about the exchange of information:
(1) the EU Savings Tax Directive (EUSD), which allows automatic exchange of
information on non-residents' interest earned on savings in their jurisdiction and
investment funds, pensions, innovative financial instruments, and payments made
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scope would be broader than that prescribed by EU law, which could
result in undesirable MFN claims among Member States, supported by
the discrimination criteria.45
Although not related to the MFN clause, FATCA produced a similar
effect in Brazil. Previously, Brazil's TIEA with the United States was
primarily based on exchange of information upon request.46 But on Sep-
tember 23, 2014, the two countries agreed on the automatic exchange
standard through an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA), whose main
goal was to expand the TIEA's scope to coalesce with FATCA.47 Despite
the fact that it was not the first law to deal with the automatic exchange
of information-the EU Saving Tax Directive has been in force since
2005-the U.S. FATCA played the fundamental role of accelerating
"upon request" information exchange's replacement by automatic ex-
change as the international standard.
The next step is the accompanying BEPS, which is described by the
OECD as "a global problem, which requires global solutions. BEPS re-
fers to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax
rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is
little or no economic activity, resulting in little or no overall corporate tax
being paid."'48 The Plan includes fifteen actions, Number Five of which is
meant to "[clounter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into
account transparency and substance. '49
through trusts and foundations; and (2) the Directive on Administrative Coopera-
tion (DAC), which prescribes the automatic exchange of information among Mem-
ber States, from 1 January 2015, if available, about five categories of income and
capital: employment, directors' fees, life insurance products (not covered by other
Directives), pensions and income from immovable property. The most recent pro-
posal adds to the scope of the DAC dividends, capital gains, any other financial
income and account balances, but instead of depending on availability of the infor-
mation, makes the exchange of information in these categories mandatory. Mem-
orandum from European Commission on Automatic exchange of information:
frequently asked questions (June 12, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-releaseMEMO-13-533_en.doc.
45. Accordingly, on 9 April 2013, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and
Spain announced their pilot multilateral exchange facility, which allows them to
exchange the same type of information amongst themselves as they will exchange
with the United States under FATCA. This pilot project should extend to another
12 EU Members (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, and Slovakia) and
should make it unnecessary for any most favored nation (MFN) claims to be made.
46. Decreto No. 8003, de 10 de Maio de 2013, DIARIO OFICIAL 1)A UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
5.10.2013 (Braz.).
47. Brazil and United States Sign Agreement on Exchange of Tax Information, U.S.
DIPLOMATIIC MISSION TIO BRAZIL (Sep. 23, 2014), http://brazil.usembassy.gov/bra-
sileuaagreementtaxinfo2.html.
48. About BEPS, supra note 31.
49. Id.
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III. TAXPAYER PROTECTION-A MATTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The OECD's efforts to expand transparency and the exchange of tax
information have not been accompanied by an impulse to protect taxpay-
ers' fundamental rights because there is no clear and structured plan to
develop taxpayer safeguards based on human rights at the international
level. Taxation entails an even stricter relationship between the taxpayer
and the tax administration because the latter is legally entitled to access
the former's assets.5 0
From the OECD perspective, one could cite the standards for the pro-
tection of rights and safeguards of taxpayers and third parties as analyzed
by the Global Forum Peer Review Reports, item C4 or Article 26(3) of
the Model Tax Convention, which states as follows:
3. In no case shall the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 be construed
so as to impose on a Contracting State the obligation:
a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;
b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in
the normal course of the administration of that or of the other Con-
tracting State;
c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business,
industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process, or in-
formation the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy
(order public). 51
A similar provision is encountered in Article 7 of the Tax Information
Exchange Agreement (TIEA) Model, which also covers confidentiality in
an attorney-client relationship.
52
Besides the OECD provisions, taxpayers are also protected by other
international sources such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UN Convention), which justifies breaches of privacy in some instances
50. C6cile Brokelind, The Role of the EU in International Tax Policy and Human
Rights: Does the EU Need a Policy on Taxation and Human Rights?, in HUMAN
RiiHTS AND TAXATION IN EUROI'E AND THE WORLD 113-128 (Kofler et al. eds.,
2011). In highlighting which human rights a taxpayer could rely with respect to the
European Union's jurisdiction, the author asserts that the protection of taxpayers'
rights is neither organized systematically nor clearly defended as a policy within
international organizations. Id. This stands in stark contrast to the European
Union's fundamental rights of the citizen, on the sole basis of which taxpayers may
obtain a remedy.
51. Update to Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and Its Commentary,
supra note 24, at 1 (emphasis added).
52. "The requested Party shall not be required to obtain or provide information that
the applicant Party would not be able to obtain under its own laws for purposes of
the administration or enforcement of its own tax laws. The competent authority of
the requested Party may decline to assist where the request is not made in con-
formity with this Agreement...." Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax
Matters, OECD, art. 7 (Apr. 18, 2002), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/
2082215.pdf.
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and expressly states that the right to privacy is not absolute. 53 On the
contrary, one's right to privacy may be freely exercised but can be limited
by others' rights, to preserve morality and maintain public order, or for
the general welfare of a democratic society.54
Brazil is a founding member of the UN.55 In 1992 Brazil ratified and
promulgated, by Decree 678, the American Convention on Human
Rights. 56 Accordingly, to the extent that Brazilian taxpayers are bound
by such treaties, they must also observe domestic laws. From this per-
spective, taxpayer protection should start with constitutional rules, partic-
ularly Article 5, where the source of individual and collective protection
can be found. 57
Among those human rights prescribed by the Brazilian Constitution,
the following clauses can be highlighted:
Article 5. All persons are equal before the law, without any dis-
tinction whatsoever, Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country
being ensured of inviolability of the right to life, to liberty, to equal-
ity, to security and to property, on the following terms:
X-the privacy, private life, honor and image of persons are invio-
lable, and the right to compensation for property or moral damages
resulting from their violation is ensured;
XII-the secrecy of correspondence and of telegraphic, data and
telephone communications is inviolable, except, in the latter case, by
court order, in the cases and in the manner prescribed by law for the
purposes of criminal investigation or criminal procedural finding of
facts.58
Brazil has been seen as one of the cooperative jurisdictions from the
OECD's standpoint, which means that the country is implementing inter-
national standards of transparency and exchange of information for tax
purposes, as concluded by the Global Forum Peer Review Report Phase
2.59 That said, "[i]n some instances the competent authority has been
unable to answer all requests in a timely manner due to a lack of re-
sources and insufficient monitoring of timeframes for obtaining and pro-
viding information." 60
53. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
54. Id.
55. Founding Member States, UNITD NATIONS, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/
founders.shtml (last visited July 11, 2015).
56. Decreto No. 678, de 6 de Novembro de 1992, D.O.U. de 9.11.1992 (Braz.).
57. CONSTrruicAo F D ERAL [C.F.] [CONSITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.).
58. Id.
59. See also Global Forum on Tax Transparency: New reports review jurisdictions' in-




In addition to being a member of the UN,61 Brazil is a member of the
G20,62 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),63 and the Global Forum
Steering Group.64 Additionally, Brazil has already negotiated clauses on
the exchange of information in thirty-four tax agreements-thirty-three
double tax treaties and one TIEA, with a further eight not yet in force-
and also signed a Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative As-
sistance for Tax Matters in November 2011.65 Furthermore, Article 26 of
the last of the Brazilian double tax treaties, which was promulgated with
Turkey in November 2013, includes the wording of Paragraph Five of the
Model, which is an innovation for Brazil.6 6 Brazil has therefore expressly
agreed that bank secrecy is not an obstacle to the exchange of tax infor-
mation within the scope of this treaty. 67
These facts confirm that Brazilian tax policy is in line with OECD, G20
and G7 requirements for tackling tax evasion. In turn, Brazil would be
recommended to set mechanisms to provide rapid and effective solutions
against any arbitrariness of the tax authorities as prescribed by the do-
mestic and international rules.
As well as implementing policies that are effective to ensure the pro-
tection of taxpayers' rights, tax administrations should strive for healthier
relationships with taxpayers. Building such a relationship goes beyond
the formal enforcement of the law and encourages voluntary compliance,
and this should not be neglected with the increasing prevalence of self-
assessment across the world. As a consequence, tax administrations
struggle to strike a balance between encouraging voluntary compliance
and penalizing abusers of the tax system. Currently, globalization and
technological advances are bringing new challenges for tax authorities.
E-commerce, cross-border transactions and bank secrecy are good exam-
ples of issues that challenge tax officials to maintain sufficient levels of
tax income while simultaneously satisfying societal interests. Intentional
tax evasion schemes are difficult to combat and tax administrations
61. Founding Member States, supra note 55.
62. G20 Member Map, G20, https://g20.org/about-g2O/g20-member-map/ (last visited
July 11, 2015).
63. Countries, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.orglcountriesl (last visited July 15, 2015); see
generally FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ (last visited July 10, 2015). The Financial
Action Task Force is a policy-making body composed of 33 states; its goals are to
set standards and implement legal, regulatory and operational measures for tack-
ling money laundering, terrorism and threats to the international financial system.
Id.
64. See generally, Steering Group, supra note 21. The Global Forum Steering Group
was set up to guide and prepare future works of the Global Forum on Trans-
parency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. Currently, its members
are Bermuda, Brazil, Cayman Islands, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Isle of Man, Kenya, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the
United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
65. Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters: Infor-
mational Brief, OECD (Nov. 2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-
of-tax-information/MAC BackgroundBrief forJounalistsNovember_2013.pdf.
66. Decreto No. 8.140, de 6 de Novembro de 2013, D.O.U. de 18.11.2013 (Braz.).
67. See id.
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should not disregard the benefits of accessing those powerful bad actors'
bank data. 68
IV. BANK SECRECY AND INTERNATIONAL TRENDS
Bank secrecy is a crucial and polemic privacy issue. Scholars and
judges have divided opinions about the constitutionality of lifting bank
secrecy solely by a tax authority's proceedings. This controversy is cen-
tered on fundamental rights. On one hand, there is an argument that
accessing personal data held by banks is a breach of privacy and conse-
quently a violation of the taxpayer's human rights. On the other hand, it
is reasonable that right to privacy should be viewed as relative and coun-
terbalanced by the interests of society as a whole.
The Brazilian Supreme Court's (STF) jurisprudence on bank secrecy is
vast. Until 1969, the judges protected professional secrecy, including ac-
countants' activities. That said, the right to secrecy was not absolute.
With that in mind, the Supreme Court has allowed bank secrecy to be
lifted in the face of a relevant public interest, but not by the manipulation
or arbitrary acts of public officials.69
Currently, Article Six of Complimentary Law 105 allows federal, state,
and local tax authorities access to taxpayers' bank information provided
that such data are indispensable to the conclusion of a prior administra-
tive or tax procedure or a fiscal audit. 70 The Supreme Court has previ-
ously considered this law and in 2010 decided by a five-to-four vote that
only judicial authorities are permitted to breach bank secrecy.71 That de-
cision, however, did not lay the issue to rest. The Supreme Court will
again have to rule on the same topic, but this time in the course of Direct
Unconstitutionality Suit 2390 (and others appended), which entails erga
omnes effects, so the decision will apply generally and not just to the liti-
gants involved.
Although the ruling is not definitive, the Supreme Court has already
upheld the so-called judicial reserve clause on access to taxpayers' finan-
cial data, based on privacy protection provided by Article 5 of the Consti-
tution.72 In so doing, though, the Court divided itself into two different
camps, as set out below.
68. "[A]ggressive tax planning... is widely recognized as a growing risk to revenue in
countries around the world. At its extremes it blurs into evasion of taxes and
fraud. The latter remain significant threats to the revenue, particularly in the con-
text of corruption, organized crime and money laundering activities." DUNCAN
BENTLEY, TAXPAYERS RIGHT-S - THEORY, ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION 314-16
(2007).
69. See HUMBERro AVILA, SISTEMA CONSTITUCIONAL TRIBUTARIO 406 (2012) (dis-
cussing limits on the power of taxing authorities and the rights of personality in the
Brazilian Constitution).
70. Lei Complementar No. 105, de 10 de Janeiro de 2001, D.O.U. de 11.1.2001 (Braz.).
71. S.T.F, Ap. Civ. No. 389808.2129315, Relator: Min. Marco Aurdlio, 15.12.2010,
Diarfo do Judiciirio Eletr6nico [D.J.e.], 10.05.2011 (Braz.).
72. C.F. [CONSTrruInON] art. 5 (Braz.).
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Justices Marco Aur6lio, Ricardo Lewandowsky, Gilmar Mendes, Celso
de Mello, and C6zar Peluso have accepted the extraordinary appeal, basi-
cally relying on the argument that the tax administration is not a neutral
party. Instead, the tax administration is a party with a true interest that
would not be harmed because it could request the judicial authorities to
grant access to all necessary data if there were reasonable grounds.
Moreover, the breach of confidentiality would require extreme legal sig-
nificance or true exceptionality.
On the other side, Justices Dias T6foli, Carmen Lticia, Ayres Britto,
and Ellen Gracie have refused the extraordinary appeal on the grounds
that the tax administration, with due respect for individual rights and
under the terms of the law, is entitled to identify the property, income,
and economic activities of every taxpayer, as prescribed by Article 145,
§10 of the Federal Constitution. 73 For this side of the argument, both
constitutional requirements were met because there would be no lack of
respect for the rights of individuals, to the extent that bank data are kept
by private institutions that are neither related to nor even part of the
state. Thus, Complimentary Law 105 would have prescribed rules in ac-
cordance with the legal order, but would have done so in an incorrect way
in Article 10, which mentions "breach of secrecy," but should instead re-
fer to "transfer of the duty of secrecy to."'74 Furthermore, a logical con-
sideration should be observed: as the tax administration is entitled to a
greater right (having access to information on all assets in the annual tax
return), so it is also entitled to a lesser one (having access to bank data).
It is worth looking particularly at the reasons given by Justice Ayres
Britto for rejecting the appeal. Invoking Article 37 of the Federal Consti-
tution,75 the justice starts from item XII of Article 5, interpreting it to
mean that the Federal Constitution protects the illegal interception, intru-
sion, and leakage of the contents of data and not the access to data it-
self.76 Finally, he concludes that the constitutional law applies to "data of
being" because these should be seen as personal assets. Conversely,
"data of having" should be viewed as accessible to authorities. In the
future, only data of being will be preserved because of transparency, a
73. "Whenever possible, taxes shall have an individual character and shall be graded
according to the economic capacity of the taxpayer, and the tax administration
may, especially to confer effectiveness upon such objectives, with due respect to
individual rights and under the terms of the law, identify the property, the incomes
and the economic activities of the taxpayer." C.F. [CONSTITUTION] art.145 (Braz.).
74. Lei Complementar No. 105, de 10 de Janeiro de 2001, D.O.U. de 11.1.2001 (Braz.).
75. "[T]ax administrations of the Union, of the States, the Federal District, and the
Municipalities, whose activities are essential for the operation of the state and are
exercised by employees of specific careers... shall work in an integrated manner,
including the sharing of tax roles and fiscal information, under the terms of the law
or of a covenant." C.F. [CoNs'ITUTION] art. 37 (Braz.).
76. See RICARDO L. TORRES, TRATADO iwE DIREITO CONSITUCIONAL FINANCEIRO E
TRI13UTARIO-VALORES E PRINUCPIOS CONSTITUCIONAIS TRIBUTARIOS, v.2 258
(2005) (rejecting the argument that the protection of bank secrecy is prescribed by
Article 5, XII of the Brazilian Constitution, and stating that this provision solely
authorizes the lifting of secrecy in cases related to telephonic communications.).
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pillar of democracy.77
The first side of the argument, in allowing the appeal, treated access by
the tax administration to taxpayers' banking data as a breach of secrecy.
In this sense, it seems logical to extend the protection of privacy because
the tax administration would not be viewed as impartial, but as a truly
interested party. But Article 6 of Complimentary Law 105 states that tax
authorities are able to access taxpayers' bank information only if such
data are indispensable for concluding an inspection procedure that has
previously been started. 78 This provision should not be viewed as giving
carte blanche to the tax administration, whose purposes must not be per-
sonal but compatible with its own institutional mission of tackling tax
evasion. In sum, one could argue that, not only are tax authorities strictly
bound by the law, but also that privacy rights are not absolute under the
law.
Klaus Tipke, when referring to the protection afforded by the combina-
tion of Articles 1 I and 2 I of the German Fundamental Law (Grundge-
setz), concludes that general personal rights grant to individuals a kind of
inviolable sphere of private life. Nevertheless, this private sphere must
yield to tax law when personal data are included in the scope of relevant
tax facts that fall within the duties of the tax administration. Basically,
the protection of the person does not forbid the examination of private
features, but provides the manner in which the assessment should be
made, as well as a prohibition against exceeding of those powers.7 9
The institutional duties of the tax administration therefore naturally
result from the features of taxation. In other words, the activities of the
tax authority should be prepared, oriented and performed to obtain the
means to ensure the existence of the state, which is a necessary condition
for the maintenance of law and the consequent protection of individual
rights.
Institutionally, the tax administration should act not for itself, but for
the benefit of all individuals. It should be understood, both internally
and externally, as a public service available to taxpayers and non-taxpay-
ers whose performance goes far beyond tax assessment. To illustrate,
consider the principles of assistance and provision for special needs-tax
authorities are committed to providing assistance for taxpayers in spite of
77. See also Farhan Hameed, Fiscal Transparency and Economic Outcomes (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 05/225). Transparency is also relevant be-
cause of its impact on the control of corruption. "After controlling certain geo-
graphical, economic, and demographic factors, the results show that countries that
are more transparent also have better control over corruption." Id.
78. Decreto No. 3.724, de 10 de Janeiro de 2001, D.O.U. de 11.1.2001 (Braz.). The
Brazilian legislation defines an Inspection Procedure as the fiscal procedures re-
ferred to in Art. 7 and following Decreto No. 70.235, de 6 de Marqo de 1972,
D.O.U. de 7.3.1972 (Braz.), which encompasses fiscal audits, seizure of goods, cus-
toms clearance and, after the impugnation of a taxpayer in accordance with Art.
14, administrative-tax procedures. Id.
79. KLAUS TIPKE & JOACHIM LANG, DIREITO TRIBU-ARIO 263-65 (Luiz D6ria Fur-
quim trans., 2008).
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budgetary restraints and other limitations on resources. Bentley concurs:
"It is important .. .the principle of assisting all taxpayers is expressly
articulated as fundamental to any tax administration." 80
In particular, tax law is part of the proper legal order of the rule of law,
and consequently its goal is to promote tax justice. Using this approach,
the rule of law requires more than authorities observing the rules and
courts ensuring compliance with the law. It is crucial that a sense of fair-
ness is developed; tax justice simultaneously depends on the morality of
imposition (besteuerungsmoral) and the morality of the taxpayers
(steuerzahler). The state's financial activity depends on the income neces-
sary to uphold the economic and legal order, thus protecting individuals
and offering them an institutional framework for developing their per-
sonal lives. So the higher the state's financial needs, the fairer the distri-
bution of the tax burden must be. Taxes, then, are the price for state
protection and institutional safety, and are a true condition for the pri-
vate economy.8 1
It should also be noted that the inspection procedures in question are
strictly related to the research phase. The Brazilian Tax Code states more
than once that fiscal action must be fully required by law.82 Therefore, in
accessing bank data, tax agents are not entitled to do anything differently
from what has already been established in the constitutional system, in-
cluding the general provisions prescribed by the Tax Code. Moreover,
this investigative step must fulfill all legal requirements (in material, juris-
dictional, temporal, personal, and quantitative aspects) to result in an
eventual tax assessment.
The duties of the tax administration must neither be performed under
any kind of bias or prejudice, nor be presumed in advance to be a particu-
lar interest of the state. We have seen before that this reflects an institu-
tional role being performed not with discretionary acts but in strict
accordance with the law. If this were not the case, all taxpayers' funda-
mental rights and all the legal obligations expressly limiting the actions of
the tax administration, both constitutional and prescribed by infra-consti-
tutional rules, would presumably be understood as having been revoked.
Consequently, instead of the previous presumption, one could argue that
it is preferable to curb the arbitrary, partial, or invasive conduct of the tax
administration by invoking binding provisions enacted by law.
On the other hand, the fact that taxpayers' fundamental rights are con-
stitutionally protected is not sufficient to ensure that those rights are fully
respected by the tax administration in a concrete case. How taxpayers
80. BENTLEY, supra note 68, at 311.
81. TnIKE & LANG, supra note 79, at 51-56.
82. Lei No. 5.172, de 25 de Outubro de 1966, Coi,. LiEis RmP. FiEiD. BRASh, 7:292,
27.10.1966 (Braz.). Tax is all compulsory monetary payment in currency or the
value of which can be expressed, which does not constitute sanction of illegal acts,
established by law and charged by fully bound administrative activity. Id. Admin-
istrative activity of tax assessment is bound and compulsory, under penalty of func-
tional responsibility. Id.
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can deal with any deviation, abuse, or arbitrariness by public officials is
crucial to effective protection. Globalization complicates this scenario in-
sofar as data could be sent to or revealed in another jurisdiction without a
given taxpayer's participation.
Federalism also challenges the balance of privacy and transparency.
Brazil is a peculiar country because it is divided into three governmental
spheres: one federal union, twenty-seven states, and 5,570 municipali-
ties.83 All of these federal entities have sufficient autonomy to run their
own tax administrations and would also be entitled to access taxpayers'
banking data if such access met the indispensability requirement. As a
consequence, taxpayers' protection could be seriously threatened in the
face of risks derived from political interference with fiscal activities.
It is very doubtful whether any of the finance secretariats of the coun-
try could access or exchange tax information without any limitation other
than those pillars of tax justice recognized by the rule of law. 84 The situa-
tion worsens if one considers that the great majority of municipalities,
and many states, have chronic budget deficits and weak administrative
and technological capacity. This is a federal problem that has no short-
term solution and supports the caution represented by the judicial reserve
clause.85
It goes without saying that constitutional systems have not always been
able to safeguard taxpayers' fundamental rights, particularly in cases
where the tax authorities act under political influence. The risks and un-
certainty are even higher if taxpayers' data are handled by more than one
jurisdiction, and especially if tax information has been exchanged
automatically. 86
Judges in favor of the judicial reserve clause have also argued that the
tax administration would not suffer any harm if it requested information
through the judiciary. This argument is unconvincing to the extent that
analysis by the courts is very time-consuming in Brazil and, in many
83. Brazil: States and Municipalities, BRAZIL, http://www.brazil.org.za/states-and-mu-
nicipalities.html (last visited July 20, 2015).
84. Luts EDUARDO SCHOUERI & MA-1xmUS CALIcci O BARBOSA, Da antitese do sigilo
d simplicidade do sistema tributdrio: os desaflos da transparencia fiscal interna-
cional, TRANSPARNCIA FISCAL E DESENVOLVIMENTO 512-14 (Eurico M. D. de
Santi et al. eds., 2013).
85. Brazil has already seen important breach of secrecy cases related to electoral or
political interests instead of public ones. For example, in 2010 Ver6nica Serra,
daughter of presidential candidate Josd Serra, had her personal tax information
illegally revealed. Before that, in 2006, Minister of Finance Ant6nio Pallocci lost
his job because of an illegal breach of bank secrecy by a caretaker, Francenildo
Costa, which involved important state institutions, such as the Secretariat of Fi-
nance and Federal Public Savings.
86. S. Van Thiel, Is There a Need for International Enforcement of Human Rights in the
Tax Area?, HUMAN RIGHTIS AN!) TAXATION IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD 174-80
(Georg Kofler et al. eds. 2011) (citing different examples of the violation of tax-
payers' fundamental rights that have occurred in Chile, Russia, Ecuador and other
countries under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice to support the
argument that there is a real need for international enforcement mechanisms to
ensure the full application of human rights in the tax area).
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cases, the success of a tax investigation could be completely dependent on
opportunity and, consequently, timing. Besides, there are increasingly so-
phisticated international tax avoidance structures whose assessment re-
quires time and skill. In sum, tax actions would be simultaneously
threatened by complexity and temporal issues such as time limits or de-
lay. This scenario will certainly be worse in the near future because there
will be an increase in exchange of information requests as international
standards develop.
Finally, for those judges who allowed the appeal, a breach of confiden-
tiality should be permitted only if there is extreme legal significance or
true exceptionality. This has to be shown by the tax administration re-
questing access to a taxpayer's banking data. Article 6 of Complimentary
Law 105 requires a showing that the information is indispensable for the
fiscal procedures in question.8 7 It is reasonable to presume that "indis-
pensable" means that the absence of the information would frustrate the
inspection procedures. Thus, the only reasonable ground for accessing
banking data comes in exceptional situations in which indispensable in-
formation concerning the taxpayer cannot be found. Examples are off-,
shore accounts and investments or even the deliberate intention of hiding-
information about revenues or assets from the tax authorities.
According to Anamourlis and Nethercott, irrespective of the immense
volume of wealth held offshore, "it is extremely difficult to obtain infor-
mation on the nature and amount of offshore investments that are under-
taken through offshore tax havens, owing to the fact that bank secrecy
and confidentiality laws inhibit the ability of revenue authorities and en-
forcement agencies to gain access to information on the affairs of taxpay-
ers who have offshore accounts or offshore investments. '88
V. PROSPECTS FOR EXCHANGING TAX INFORMATION
AUTOMATICALLY IN A GLOBAL SCENARIO
Encouraged by the same goal of engaging in the automatic exchange of
information, in 2013 Brazil and fifty-three other members of the Global
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes-
along with the Commonwealth Secretariat, the European Commission
and the World Bank Group-set up the Automatic Exchanging of Infor-
mation Global Forum, whose principal objectives are to monitor and re-
view the implementation of the automatic exchange of information
standard and to help developing countries benefit from that standard. 89
Together with forty-eight other countries, Brazil also signed the Decla-
ration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters, which was
87. Lei Complementar No. 105, de 10 de Janeiro de 2001, D.O.U. de 11.1.2001 (Braz.).
88. Anamourlis & Nethercott, supra note 4, at 617-18.
89. Automatic Exchange of Information, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency
/automaticexchangeofinformation.htm (last visited July 20, 2015).
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adopted on May 6, 2014.90 In pertinent part, the Declaration: (1) declares
that the signatories "are determined to tackle cross-border tax fraud and
tax evasion and to promote international tax compliance through mutual
administrative assistance in tax matters and a level playing field"; (2) con-
firms "that automatic exchange of financial account information will fur-
ther these objectives particularly if the new single global standard,
including full transparency on ownership interests, is implemented among
all financial centers"; and (3) states that the signatories have determined
"to implement the new single global standard swiftly, on a reciprocal ba-
sis," and that they "will translate the standard into domestic law, includ-
ing to ensure that information on beneficial ownership of legal persons
and arrangements is effectively collected and exchanged in accordance
with the standard." 9
1
Although the Global Forum Report concluded that "Brazil's legal
framework and its practical implementation ensure that ownership, ac-
counting and bank information is available and tax authorities have ac-
cess powers to obtain the requested information," the judicial reserve
clause contradicts that finding.92 As mentioned above, the tax adminis-
tration would have to be authorized by the judicial authorities to access
taxpayers' personal banking data. Moreover, such a request could be de-
nied or delayed to the point that it would become unnecessary or ineffec-
tive to send the information to another state or even for the Brazilian tax
authorities to examine it.
Whereas international organizations such as the OECD, G7, and G20
have worked hard to implement the automatic exchange of information
as a new global standard, the effects of the Brazilian judicial reserve
clause would depend on the type of tax information in which the tax ad-
ministration has an interest. Article 146 of the Federal Constitution
prescribes that complimentary laws regulate the constitutional limitations
on the power to tax.93 Article 6 of Complimentary Law 105 therefore
restricts the tax administration's access to personal banking data.94 This
limitation is likely to reduce the scope of automatic exchanges of infor-
mation given the lack of available data in the absence of inspection pro-
cedures that are already taking place.
But Article 5 of Complimentary Law 105 authorizes the Executive
Branch to regulate the criteria according to which the financial institu-
tions must inform the tax administration of the Union about the transac-
tions made by the users of their services. Information under this
provision will be restricted to the identification of the holders of such
90. Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters (May 6-7,
2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/mcm/MCM-2014-Declaration-Tax.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Global Forum on Tax Transparency: New Reports Review Jurisdictions' Informa-
tion Exchange, supra note 59.
93. "A complimentary law shall: ... regulate the constitutional limitations on the
power to tax ...." C.F. [CoNs'rrruTION] art.146 (Braz.).
94. Lei Complementar No. 105, de 10 de Janeiro de 2001, D.O.U. de 11.1.2001 (Braz.).
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transactions and the global amounts handled every month for each user-
any evidence that could identify the origin or nature of the expenses is
prohibited. 95 As can be seen, this provision fits better with the reach of
the automatic exchange of information standard.
Consequently, data on financial transactions governed by Article 5
could be exchanged automatically by the tax authorities more easily than
personal data about taxpayers governed by Article 6. Whereas the for-
mer flows from the banks on a regular basis, the latter is protected by
legal constraints and could soon be the target of the judicial reserve
clause. Brazil therefore risks violating international public law by either
not observing the treaty clauses about the timely exchange of information
or, alternatively, ignoring international human rights protection (and also
constitutional rules) depending on the manner in which the tax adminis-
tration deals with a taxpayer's personal data when it sends them to an-
other state.
As to the manner in which the tax administration deals with taxpayers's
personal data under domestic law, Schoueri and Barbosa suggest that
Brazil should enact legislation to ensure both the participation of the tax-
payer prior to the exchange of information and the full observance of the
due process of the law. This encompasses, among other things, official
publication of administrative acts, rights to communication, submission of
closing arguments, production of evidence and the right to appeal. More-
over, taxpayers are also entitled to have knowledge of the administrative
procedures in which they are interested, be able to examine records and
obtain certificates, and be informed about judgments. 96
One could argue that the judicial reserve clause reduces the scope of
the automatic exchange of information, but this standard for transferring
data has not yet proven to be an effective means of detecting illicit cross-
border transactions. To be effective, a system through which information
is exchanged automatically requires a high investment in technological
and administrative structures. For this reason such a standard is generally
set by developed countries but not by developing ones.
As a result, doubts arise about the effectiveness of the flow of informa-
tion between developing and developed countries. Additionally, risks of
breaches of confidentiality remain, irrespective of the judicial reserve
clause, because "there is concern that when information is exchanged au-
tomatically, the potential for error in exchanging large quantities of tax-
payer information globally possesses risks of breaching the confidentiality
provisions."97
95. Decreto No. 4.489, de 28 de Novembro de 2002, D.O.U. de 29.11.2002 (Braz.).
96. ScuiouLIu & BARBOSA, supra note 84, at 516-19.
97. Oguttu, supra note 32, at 5-6, 9.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The international community has valued transparency and the ex-
change of information too highly as an effective means of tackling tax
competition. Countries have been brought together to cooperate with
each other because, by themselves, they are not capable of dealing with
all of the implications of globalization, particularly harmful tax practices.
This led, ultimately, to the BEPS Action Plan of 2014. These aspects
have also been considered by international organizations, headed by the
OECD, which have been working to establish the automatic exchange of
information for tax purposes as a global standard.
Brazilian tax policy is moving towards this sense of openness, in line
with the international order, as can be seen with the recently signed
TIEAs or the inclusion of Article 26(5) of the Model Tax Convention in
the double tax treaty with Turkey. The country was also reported to be a
reliable and cooperative partner by the Global Forum on Tax Trans-
parency, which stated that the Brazilian tax authorities have power to
obtain information on request and that banking information is available.
But doubts arise about the possibility of the Brazilian tax administra-
tion systematically and periodically sending taxpayers' data to another
jurisdiction, as required by the international standards for the automatic
exchange of information. In addition to the non-judicial issues, such as
the necessary investments in technology and manpower to set up a suc-
cessful structure for exchanging information automatically, Article 6 of
Complimentary Law 105 is at risk of again being judged unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court. If this decision is made, the tax administration
would not have direct access to a taxpayer's personal banking data, even
if the legal requirements are met, due to the judicial reserve clause.
Although the judicial reserve clause does not prevent a fiscal investiga-
tion, it will probably dampen the enthusiasm of the tax authorities for
accessing taxpayers' information. The sluggishness of the judicial system
and the difficulties of creating tax courts throughout the country could
temporarily interfere with the effectiveness of the tax inspection proce-
dures. As a result, the country may not respond to a request in a timely
manner.
Extending the concept of confidentiality so far seems problematic
when one considers that the rule of law must protect not only individual
but also collective rights. If individuals or corporations evade taxes, tax
collection will certainly not decrease, as someone else will bear that bur-
den. Beyond the question of tax, there are also economic-legal conse-
quences because free competition and free initiatives have to be
protected by the state. It should also be noted that inspection procedures
are strictly required by law to be covered by a veil of secrecy. There is no
ability for the tax administration to reveal any data relating to a taxpayer,
and consequently it is difficult to identify a breach of confidentiality when
tax duties are performed in the interest of society as a whole, which is
after all the true addressee of public policies and services.
INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION
On the other hand, there have been extensive incentives to enhance
transparency, but nothing that overrides the rules requiring the funda-
mental rights of taxpayers to be observed. It is crucial to strike a balance
between the investigative powers of tax administrations and mechanisms
for the rapid and effective protection of taxpayers' fundamental rights.
Cases of overactive tax authorities abound worldwide and Brazil is no
different.
In relation to this, because taxpayers' banking data are accessible not
only to the Brazilian Federal Revenue Service but also to thousands of
subnational state and municipal tax authorities, doubts arise about the
expected protection of human rights, particularly if one considers the pos-
sibility of political influence on tax duties. Furthermore, the prior knowl-
edge and participation of interested taxpayers must be observed by the
tax authorities when they access, collect and exchange personal banking
data, according to the due process of the rule of law.
Therefore, beyond the clash between transparency and privacy, it is
crucial that relevant issues are addressed so that an effective fiscal policy
is created that is capable of developing a sense of fairness, which involves
the morality of both the tax administration and the taxpayers.
Naturally, action must be taken against fraud and tax evasion schemes,
taking into consideration that privacy is a relative right. Difficulties re-
main about the manner in which transparency is handled when satisfying
the domestic jurisdiction and other requesting states because banks
should not act in bad faith as shelters for taxpayers. In the same manner,
the absence of rapid and effective internal and international mechanisms
to safeguard human rights must not allow tax authorities to act in an arbi-
trary way. In sum, exchanging tax information can be an obstacle to the
global impetus, especially when developing countries are supposed to
provide tax or bank information in a timely manner.
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